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Abstract
We study a benchmark model with collateral constraints and heterogeneous
discounting. Contrarily to a rich literature on borrowing limits, we allow for
rental markets. By incorporating this missing market, we show that impa-
tient agents choose to rent rather than to own the collateral in the neighbor-
hood of the deterministic steady state. Consequently, impatient agents are
not indebted and borrowing constraints play no role in local dynamics.
JEL classification: E30, R31.
Keywords: heterogeneous discounting, collateral constraints, rental market,
credit market.
1 Introduction
In recent years, a rich literature has developed to study the role of collateral
constraints in driving fluctuations throughout the business cycle.
Collateral constraints are a common feature of housing finance in the
developed world (IMF, 2008; Iacoviello, 2010; Calza et al. forthcoming).
They are aimed at responding to enforcement limits of debt contracts: in
case of default, the creditor can seize borrowers’ real assets. Moreover, the
structure of this type of debt limits implies a strong linkage between agent’s
access to credit and real estate markets, which is of empirical relevance.
Introducing borrowing limits into an otherwise frictionless framework en-
tails significant deviations from the Modigliani-Miller theorem. Moreover, all
shocks aﬀecting the value of the collateral are amplified and spread through-
out the economy via their impact on credit markets themselves. However, for
this financial accelerator mechanism to work, two ingredients are necessary.
First, the borrowing limit has to bind in equilibrium. Second, at each period
the economy needs to be populated by a set of agents willing both to lend
and borrow up to the limit. Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias (1987) show
that one way to insure this is to introduce discount-factors heterogeneity.
Indeed, impatient agents are always debt constrained while patient agents
are willing to lend.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) introduce collateral constraints on land value
together with heterogeneous discount rates to study the impact of the fi-
nancial accelerator mechanism. They show how the propagation mechanism
mentioned above can be decomposed into a static multiplier and a powerful
dynamic multiplier entailing persistent cycles.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), a large literature has developed
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incorporating heterogeneous discounting to insure binding collateral con-
straints. Iacoviello (2005) introduces collateral constraints into the housing
market. Because the structure of credit limits implies that agents can bor-
row more whenever their housing wealth rises, there is a strong correlation
between movements in housing wealth and movements in aggregate consump-
tion. Indeed, relatively poor people with lower propensity to save respond
more to changes in housing wealth. These properties of the model allow him
to explain the amplification of cycles and to match some empirical stylized
facts (Iacoviello 2010).
In light of the extensive use of the benchmark model in the literature,
we analyze some fundamental features of the model and their implications
for the equilibrium. To this purpose, we focus on a standard housing model
where the collateral is real estate1. We believe that the standard framework
is based on the implicit assumption that the only way to benefit from housing
services is to own real properties. We relax this assumption by introducing
a rental market. Thus the modified model accounts for agents who can
own real assets and produce housing services for themselves, and renters
who buy housing services from landlords. Agents face a portfolio decision;
they confront the trade-oﬀ between investing in real estate or in financial
assets/ being indebted. Our analysis shows that in this context, in contrast to
the above mentioned literature, the optimal behavior of the impatient agent
generically consists in not investing in housing. Therefore, the equilibrium
is characterized by no private debt. Indeed, the impatient agent aims at
increasing current consumption as much as possible. When agents can borrow
less than the entire value of their house (i.e., the loan-to-value ratio is less
1Alternatively, we could have chosen as collateral land or other durable collaterizable
assets. This would not have changed the results of our analysis.
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than one), any increase in real properties implies a less than proportional
increase in private borrowing, and thus, current consumption. In this case,
impatient agents choose not to invest in housing thereby consuming all of
period-t income. Consequently, the credit market collapses and impatient
agents buy housing services on the rental market, leaving no role to collateral
constraints.
2 The model
There are two types of agents who are characterized by diﬀerent discount
rates. Both agents derive utility from consuming nondurable goods and hous-
ing services. They can buy and/or rent housing units (i.e., square meters)
and have access to the credit market. Henceforth, we will denote the agent
having a relatively higher preference for the present as the impatient agent,
and the one with the highest discount rate, as the patient one.
The objective function of the representative impatient agent at date  = 0
can be written as:
max
0
∞X
=0
 ( )  (1)
where  represents nondurable consumption,  represents consumption of
housing services,  ∈ (0 1) is the discount factor and function  ( ) is
increasing, concave and satisfies the Inada conditions in both arguments.
Finally, 0 is the expectation operator conditional to the information set at
date  = 0. The budget constraint at date  ≥ 0 can be written as:
 −  +  +  ( − ) = −1 −−1−1 +  (2)
where  is the relative price of one unit of housing  and  is outstand-
ing private debt. Moreover,  is the rent-to-price ratio,  is the interest
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factor that prevails on the credit market and  is the (exogenous) income
endowment. Therefore,  −  represents the net wealth of the agent and
 ( − ) represents the rent paid to or received from the landlord depend-
ing on whether the agent eventually buys (i.e., rents housing) or produces
(i.e., owns and rents) housing services.
An impatient agent’s debt,  is constrained to be less than or equal to
a share  ∈ (0 1) of the expected present value of their housing holdings.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the constraint can be written as:
 ≤ +1  (3)
The housing stock cannot be negative, thus:
 ≥ 0 (4)
Let us denote by 01 ( ) the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with
the collateral constraint (3) and by 01 ( )  the one associated with the
non-negativity constraint (4). The first order conditions of the impatient
agent with respect to housing assets and debt read as:
− (1− ) + +1
0
1 (+1 +1)
01 ( ) +
+1
 +  = 0 (5)
1−
0
1 (+1 +1)
01 ( ) −  = 0 (6)
Condition (5) represents the arbitrage between the marginal cost of investing
in housing,  (1− )  and the marginal gain deriving from future nondurable
consumption and from increasing borrowing, provided that constraint (3) is
binding. When (3) is not binding,  is equal to zero and condition (6) is
the standard Euler equation with respect to private debt. When  6= 0, the
marginal utility of present consumption is larger than the discounted utility
of future consumption. Therefore, agents borrow up to the limit to increase
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current consumption and constraint (3) is binding. Moreover, complementary
slackness conditions can be written as:µ
+1 − 
¶
 = 0 (7)
 = 0 (8)
The representative patient agent is similar to the impatient one. The
main diﬀerence lies in the discount factor,  ∈ ( 1). The objective function
of the patient agent at date  = 0 can be written as:
max∗ ∗
0
∞X
=0
 (∗  ∗ )  (9)
where starred letters refer to patient-agent variables. The budget constraint
is the same as the one described in (2) except that ∗ are bonds (i.e., the
funds lent to impatient agents):
∗ + ∗ + ∗ +  (∗ − ∗ ) = ∗−1 +−1∗−1 + ∗  (10)
For simplicity, we do not introduce borrowing constraints as, in equilibrium,
the patient agent holds a non-negative quantity of bonds, provided that the
relative transversality condition is imposed. Moreover, the patient agent’s
housing stock cannot be negative:
∗ ≥ 0 (11)
Let us denote by 01 (∗  ∗ ) the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with
the non negativity constraint (11). The intertemporal arbitrage conditions
with respect to ∗ and ∗ can be written as:
− (1− ) + +1
0
1
¡∗+1 ∗+1¢
01 (∗  ∗ ) +  = 0 (12)
−1 +
0
1
¡∗+1 ∗+1¢
01 (∗  ∗ ) = 0 (13)
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They represent the patient-agent counterpart of conditions (5) and (6). More-
over, the complementary slackness condition is:
∗ = 0 (14)
3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, market clearing conditions for nondurable goods ( + ∗ =
+∗ ), housing services (+∗ = +∗ ) and for the credit market ( = ∗ )
need to hold.
We now focus on a deterministic steady state characterized by constant
levels for all variables, including relative prices. Our main result is the fol-
lowing.
Proposition. Impatient agents hold no debt or housing assets and buy hous-
ing services from patient agents on the rental market.
Proof. At the steady state, condition (13) determines the interest factor,
 = 1, which, once replaced in condition (6), gives  = 1 −   0.
Moreover, condition (12) gives the rent-to-price ratio:  = 1 −  − .
Substituting the resulting values for   and  into condition (5) gives:
 =  (1−) (− ) +  This condition allows us to conclude that   0.
This and (8) imply that  = 0 and, using condition (7), that  = 0. The
market clearing condition on the credit market implies ∗ = 0 while the one
on the housing market implies ∗  0 Finally, (11) implies   0. ¤
The above Proposition represents the main point of this note and deserves
some discussion.
At the steady state where marginal utilities are constant, one of the two
types of agents needs to be constrained because of the unique interest rate. If
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the interest rate was determined by the discount rate of the impatient agent,
the patient agent would be willing to lend his entire endowment. Because
of the Inada conditions on consumption, this cannot be an equilibrium of
our model. On the contrary, if the interest rate depended on the discount
rate of the patient agent, the impatient agent would be willing to borrow as
much as possible to increase his current-period consumption, but would be
constrained by the borrowing limit. This is a possible equilibrium. Therefore,
 = 1 This result has been emphasized by Becker (1980) and Becker and
Foias (1987) in a framework with an infinite number of discount factors and
a non-negativity constraint on capital. Indeed, in the presence of discount-
factor heterogeneity, the interest rate is eventually set by the "dominant
consumer": the most patient agent and the only one who accumulates capital.
No other agents accumulate capital as they use their current incomes for
consumption.
However, according to the above considerations, it would be surprising if
the impatient agent invested in housing units, as any increase in real proper-
ties raises his net asset position and decreases current consumption. Indeed,
debt is strictly lower than the discounted value of housing. Thus, the impa-
tient agent does not invest in housing, implying via the collateral constraint,
a zero net asset position. The impatient agent is constrained; however, al-
lowing for the rental market implies that he does not accumulate housing
units. Thus, he does not have access to borrowing and the credit market
eventually plays no role.
Moreover, given that the marginal utility of housing services tends to
infinity when the housing stock tends to zero, the patient agent wants to
own real properties. As expected, the no-arbitrage condition between debt
and real assets entails equating their returns. At the steady state where all
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variables and prices are constant, the return on housing only depends on the
opportunity cost of renting (i.e., the rent to price ratio, ) The return on
real assets is in turn equal to: 1(1− ). The rent-to-price ratio is thus equal
to  = 1−  and the dominant consumer imposes both the interest rate and
rents.
There are only two cases where it is optimal for the impatient agent to
invest in housing. The first case is the one considered by the aforementioned
literature. When real assets are incorporated into the utility function and/or
into the production function2, housing investment is necessary because of
Inada conditions. There is not a clear-cut consensus about the economic
appropriateness of incorporating assets into the utility function. Convinc-
ing examples supporting this modelling decision are Carroll (2000) and the
literature related to the "spirit of capitalism" (Zou, 1995). However, the
assumption is used to explain the right tail of the wealth distribution3. This
is clearly at odds with the above mentioned literature, where the entire pop-
ulation eventually needs to own real estate. Also, while being meaningful for
housing services, the Inada conditions cannot be imposed on housing assets.
Note finally that having housing into the utility function can be interpreted
as imperfect altruism, which is at odd with an infinitely lived rational agent.
Bequest considerations would thus not aﬀect our analysis unless we intro-
duce overlapping generations and change the entire structure of the model
(Iacoviello and Pavan, 2013).
Alternatively, there is a second and limit case, when  = 1. In the
above analysis, we have excluded the possibility for the loan-to-value ratio
2Instead of introducing housing into the utility function, we could have instead intro-
duced it into the production function, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Our results would
still hold.
3However, with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, Luo and Young (2009) show that spirit
of capitalism preferences lead to less inequality in wealth.
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to be equal to one both on theoretical and empirical fundamentals. Indeed,
  1 is consistent both with debt contracts to be subject to enforcement
limits (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) and with empirical evidence (Calza et al.,
forthcoming). In this context, the portfolio of the impatient agent is indeter-
minate. Investing in real assets entails an equivalent increase in debt, which
does not eventually modify his net asset position or aﬀect his consumption.
The following corollary focuses on this point.
Corollary. Let  = 1, then  ≥ 0 and ∗ ≥ 0 with at least one inequality
holding strictly. Moreover,  and ∗ are indeterminate.
Proof. When  = 1  =  (1−) (− ) +  =  Therefore,  =
  0, implying  = 0,  = 0 and ∗ = 0 However, the Inada conditions
on housing services imply that at least one of the two agents needs to hold
housing assets, excluding this possibility. Alternatively, if  =  = 0 and thus
 ≥ 0 and ∗ ≥ 0 with at least one of the two inequalities holding strictly.
Finally, by substituting the steady-state values  = 1  = 1 − 
and  = 1 −  together with the steady-state arbitrage condition between
housing and nondurable consumption, 02 ( ) = 01 ( )  into (2), it is
straightforward to see that the impatient agent’s nondurable consumption
is only aﬀected by current income,  for any level of housing holdings, 
Analogous considerations apply for the patient agent. ¤
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